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STOCK OPTION DISCLOSURES OF DIRECTORS: WHERE 
TRANSPARENCY CAN MASK SECRECY 
 
 
Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose of the paper:  
 
We investigate the stock option disclosures of directors and the five most 
highly remunerated officers in the directors’ report of Australian companies for the 
years 2000 and 2002 and the choice to position these disclosures in the notes to the 
financial statements as opposed to the directors’ report. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: 
 
Our study examines the compliance with mandatory disclosures for stock 
options for companies in the top 400 and also ascertains if there is consistent 
compliance across all required categories, including sensitive disclosures. 
 
Findings:  
 
Although compliance is high for most of the required stock option disclosures, 
43 of the 153 firms in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of the options 
issued. Another 27 of the companies disclosed a “Nil” value for the value of options 
issued. Most of the companies disclosed the information in the directors’ report, with 
larger companies and companies in the finance industry more likely to disclose in the 
notes to the financial statements, where the information is less visible. 
 
Original/value of the paper:  
 
The results indicate that companies were secretive about the most sensitive of 
the required disclosures, the amount (value) of the options issued.  Regulators and 
researchers need to be cautious in conducting compliance studies as although 
companies appear to be transparent in their disclosures about stock options for 
directors, closer examination reveals secrecy about sensitive components of the 
required disclosures. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate compliance with mandatory stock option 
disclosures of directors and the five most highly remunerated officers for Australian 
companies in the top 400 for the years 2000 and 2002.  We also examine, firstly, 
whether there is consistent compliance across all categories of required disclosures, 
including sensitive disclosures, and, secondly, the choice to position these disclosures 
in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to the directors’ report.  An impact 
of this management choice is that the disclosures in the notes to the financial 
statements are audited, whereas the Directors’ Report, which is more likely to be read 
by users, only needs to be checked by the auditors for consistency with the financial 
statements.1   
Prior research suggests that the format in which information is communicated, 
for example disclosure in footnotes versus recognition in the income statement or 
balance sheet, affects the extent to which the information affects users’ judgements.  It 
has been suggested (Cotter and Zimmer, 2003; Liang and Zhang, 2006; and Nelson 
and Taylor, 2007) that disclosure signals to users that the information is less useful. 
Additionally, information disclosed in the footnotes is less accessible to users due to 
the limitations in human information processing (Maines and McDaniel, 2000).  The 
above research would suggest that the directors’ report is more accessible or 
transparent to users than information in footnotes. 
                                                 
1 AUS 212 requires any ‘other information’ in the annual report to be reviewed by the auditor to ascertain that the 
information contained therein is (i) materially consistent with the information provided in the audited financial 
report and (ii) there is no material misstatement of fact.  Examples of ‘other information’ include the Directors’ 
Report.   
Stock Option Disclosures of Directors: Where Transparency Can Mask Secrecy 
 
 
 3
Executive remuneration is a controversial topic both in Australia and 
internationally, in an environment of increasing executive pay and corporate collapses 
(Hill and Yablon, 2003).  The component of executive pay that has received the most 
criticism is stock options. For example, the CEO of AMP attracted considerable 
criticism in 2002 when seeking an extension of his options vesting date (Boyd and 
Clegg, 2002). This extension was sought after interim profit slumped 25 percent to 
$303 million. Due to public outrage, he reversed this decision (Hewitt, 2002). 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board has only recently mandated 
recognition of the expense of executive stock options in financial reports, with the 
adoption of international accounting standards as of 1 January 2005. Therefore, until 
mandatory recognition of stock options was introduced, investors and other users of 
financial statements with an interest in stock options primarily relied on the disclosure 
of statutory information to evaluate the appropriateness of executive stock options in 
corporate remuneration decisions.  We have chosen the years 2000 and 2002 in order 
to observe any changes in the level of disclosure from 2000 to 2002 due to a change in 
the regulatory environment with the introduction of the Corporations Act 2001. 
Several corporate collapses occurred in 2001, which may also have had an impact on 
the disclosure levels of firms.   
The Corporations Law/Act2  requires information on the “details of the nature 
and amount of each element of the emolument of each director and each of the five 
named officers of the company receiving the highest emolument (s.300A (1) (c))” to 
be disclosed in the directors’ report.  However, firms are allowed to transfer the 
                                                 
2 The disclosure requirements relevant to this study which are contained in the Corporations Act 2001, 
are identical to those in contained in the Corporations Law. The Corporations Law is applicable to the 
2000 financial year and the Corporations Act 2001 is applicable to the 2002 financial year. 
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information to the notes to the financial statements. To measure compliance, we use a 
disclosure index based on the requirements of the Corporations Law and Corporations 
Act 2000., which specifically address stock option disclosures.  
This study is motivated by the limited Australian research in the area of 
disclosures about directors and executive stock options..   Much of the research in the 
area of stock options has been in relation to the usage, valuation and recognition 
issues that surround stock options. Our study is also motivated by earlier studies 
finding a low level of compliance with accounting standards that apply to executive 
and employee stock option disclosures (Nelson and Percy, 2005; Basset, Koh and 
Tutticci, 2007). Nelson and Percy (2005) also report that the lowest level of 
compliance is displayed for sensitive disclosures on the value of options issued. 
Previous studies have found that in some environments, firms behave towards 
mandatory requirements as if they are voluntary (Marston and Shrives, 1996; Hope, 
2003a).  
Transparent financial statements are statements that “reveal the events, 
transactions, judgments, and estimates underlying the statements, and their 
implications” (Pownall and Schipper, 1999, 262). Morris et al. (2004, 196) state that 
the disclosure of financial information in company annual reports appears to be a 
“necessary but not sufficient component of corporate transparency. These authors 
measure compliance with accounting standards as one important component of the 
broader concept, corporate transparency.  Coulton et al., (2003) demonstrated that a 
change in accounting regulations increased the level of transparency of CEO 
compensation disclosures, including stock options over the three year period, 1998 to 
2000.  
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 The results of our study reveal that most of the companies disclosed the 
information in the directors’ report, with larger companies and companies in the 
finance industry more likely to disclose the requirements in the notes to the financial 
statements, where the disclosures are less visible. Although companies were 
complaint with most of the statutory requirements on stock options for directors and 
the five most highly remunerated officers, 43 of the 153 firms in the sample which 
issued options, did not disclose the value of the options issued and another 27 of the 
companies disclosed a “Nil” value for the value of options issued.   That is, companies 
were very secretive about the most sensitive of the required disclosures, the amount 
(value) of the options issued.   
The remaining sections of this paper are as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional background. Section 3 reviews previous literature and outlines the 
research questions.  Section 4 outlines the data and research design.  Section 5 
presents the results and section 6 provides the concluding comments. 
 
 
2. Institutional Background 
The sections of the Corporations Law and the Corporations Act 2001 that are 
relevant to this study include sections s.300A (1)(c), s.300(1)(d) and s.300(5)3. The 
disclosures are required to be made in the directors’ report, however, section s. 300(2) 
allows for the requirements of s.300 to be included in the notes to the financial 
statements. Under PN 68.77B of Practice Note 68 ‘New Financial Reporting and 
Procedural Requirements’ issued by the Australian Securities and Investment 
                                                 
3 The disclosure requirements of these sections are identical in both the Corporations Law and 
Corporations Act 2001. 
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Commission (ASIC), also allow for the disclosure requirements of s.300A to be 
transferred to the notes of the financial statements.   
  The Corporations Law and the Corporations Act 2001 establish disclosure 
requirements for the stock options granted to directors and the five most highly 
remunerated officers of the firm.  The disclosure requirements are as follows: 
Section s.300A (1)(c) Annual directors' report—specific information to be provided by 
listed companies:  
(1) The directors' report for a financial year for a company must also include:  
(c) details of the nature and amount of each element of the emolument of each director and each of the 
5 named officers of the company receiving the highest emolument. 
 
Section s. 300(1)(d) and s. 300 (5) Annual directors' report—specific information  
(1) The directors' report for a financial year must include details of:  
(d) options that are:  
(i) granted over unissued shares or unissued interests during or since the end of the year; and  
(ii) granted to any of the directors or any of the 5 most highly remunerated officers of the company; 
and  
(iii) granted to them as part of their remuneration; 
 
(5) The details of an option granted are:  
(a) the company, registered scheme or disclosing entity granting the option; and  
(b) the name of the person to whom the option is granted; and  
(c) the number and class of shares or interests over which the option is granted.  
 
Practice Note 68 provides guidance about the amount of emolument (s.300A 
(1)(c)) in relation to options. PN 68.60 states that the elements of emoluments to be 
disclosed would normally include the value of options granted.  
 
3. Prior literature and research questions 
Several studies examining the compliance levels of firms with particular 
countries’ accounting regulations agree that without adequate enforcement of these 
regulations, firms will not fully comply with the legislation (Hope, 2003a; Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994). In Australia, Coulton et al., (2003) have demonstrated that a change 
in accounting regulations increased the level of transparency of disclosure. However, 
Nelson and Percy (2005) find that the transparency of ESO disclosures in the years 
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2000 and 2002 is low. In investigating the mandatory employee-related disclosures 
made in the directors’ report of 100 large U.K. firms for the year 2000, Day and 
Woodward (2004) find a non-compliance level of 33 percent. Reasons suggested for 
the non-compliance include the lack of enforcement of existing sanctions and the lack 
of monitoring of the information content of accounts and reports. 
In the year 2001, the business environment saw the introduction of a new 
piece of legislation, the Corporations Act 2001.  Coulton et al., (2003) study 
transparency of disclosure over a three-year period in which there was a regulatory 
change.  They find that disclosure became more transparent after the regulatory 
change occurred.  Also in 2001, there were numerous corporate collapses, some of 
which had a large impact on the world market.  Due to the severity of some of these 
collapses, shareholders will want reassurance about the extent of transparency of the 
disclosures of their companies. As such it is expected that companies will begin to 
disclose more information in 2002 in order to retain the trust of their shareholders. 
The Corporations Law/Act requires information on stock options to be 
disclosed in the directors’ report; however, firms are allowed to transfer this 
information to the notes to the financial statements. Management thus has discretion 
about where to position these disclosures.  An impact of this management choice is 
that the disclosures in the notes to the financial statements are audited, whereas the 
Directors’ Report, which is more likely to be read by users only needs to be checked 
by the auditors for consistency with the financial statements. The above leads to the 
first research question: 
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Research Question 1(a): Are the disclosures on stock options compliant with the 
mandatory requirements for directors and the five most highly remunerated officers of 
a company? 
1(b) Does the level of compliance improve from 2000 to 2002? 
1(c): Is the level of compliance consistent across all categories of mandatory 
requirements?  
1(d): Are these stock option disclosures more likely to be in the directors’ report or 
the notes to the financial statements?  
The size of a firm can influence the level of disclosures in the companies’ 
annual reports.  Larger firms can easily generate detailed information for reporting 
purposes as they are already using the information for their own reporting purposes.  
These firms are more visible to the public and as such are subject to greater public and 
government pressure to provide more detailed disclosures (Hope, 2003a; Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994). Furthermore, the type of industry can have a strong impact on a 
company’s disclosure practices, for example, industries with a higher level of risk 
may disclose more information regarding their operations (Hope, 2003c and Dye and 
Sridhar, 1995).   Research question two follows from the above: 
Research Question 2(a): Are larger companies more likely to disclose this 
information in the notes to the financial statements than in the directors’ report? 
Research Question 2(b): Is there an association between the level of disclosures in 
the directors’ report and industry membership? 
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4. Data and Research Design 
The firms used in this study are selected from the top 400 listed companies 
using the BRW Top 500 for 2002.  To be included in the study, these firms must 
satisfy the following: 
a) Financial year ending 30 June; 
b) Listed on the ASX for 2000 and 2002; 
c) Granted stock options in 2000 or 20024. 
The total sample size used is 153 firms, pooled for the financial years 2000 
and 2002.  Table 1 illustrates how firms are eliminated from the sample. The reports 
are obtained from the Annual Report Collection (Connect 4) online database. The data 
on stock option disclosures relating to directors and the top five highest remunerated 
officers is manually collected from the annual reports. The years 2000 and 2002 have 
been chosen in order to observe any changes in the level of disclosure due to a change 
in the regulatory environment with the introduction of the Corporations Act 2001.  
The dependent variable is a continuous variable measured as the total of 
mandatory stock option disclosures made in the directors’ report divided by the total 
overall mandatory stock option disclosures.  This study uses a disclosure index based 
on the requirements contained in the Corporations Law/Act. Six elements of 
information are identified.  These elements require the disclosure of: the nature and 
amount of the emolument (i.e. stock options), the company (or other entity) granting 
the options, the names of the people receiving the options and the number and type of 
shares under option. A score of one is given for each item in the index that is 
                                                 
4 Sections s.300A(1)(c) and s.300(5) of the Corporations Law and the Corporations Act 2001 only 
applies to options that have been granted in that financial year. 
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disclosed, and a zero is given where the information is not disclosed. The index is 
described in Appendix A. 
In order to derive an overall score, the total items disclosed are added together.  
This number is then divided by the total number of items that should be disclosed.  
This provides a final score out of one. For example, if a firm discloses four out of six 
items of information, the calculation is 4/6, which equals 66.67 percent.  This score is 
the firm’s overall compliance score.   
Initially the directors’ report is examined for the information as the 
Corporations Law/Act requires these disclosures in the directors’ report.  However, 
the legislation allows firms to transfer this information to the notes of the financial 
report.  Therefore, when the information is not located in the directors’ report; the 
notes to the firms’ financial report are examined for the remaining information.  The 
amount of information actually disclosed in the directors’ report is then noted. That is, 
out of the six disclosure requirements, how much of this information is disclosed in 
the directors’ report? 
The first independent variable, size (LOGASSET), is measured as the log of 
total assets because of the large difference in the amount of assets, for example 
$217,671,000,000 as opposed to $7,147,707.  Prior research suggests that companies 
would aim to reduce their political sensitivity by disclosing more information in the 
notes to the financial statements, which are less visible (Nelson and Tayler (2007). 
This study predicts a negative relationship between size of the firm and percentage of 
information in the directors’ report. 
The second independent variable, industry (IND_CODE), is measured by 
classifying the sample into finance and non-finance using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.  
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A score of one is awarded to firms that are in the finance industry and a zero is 
awarded otherwise. The finance industry consists of banks and diversified financials.5 
The finance industry is very much in the public eye.  These firms are usually larger 
and more politically sensitive. It is thought that they will try to reduce their political 
sensitivity by disclosing more information in the audited notes to the financial 
statements.  This study predicts a negative relationship between industry and 
percentage of information in the directors’ report. 
 
5. Results 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on each of the components required to 
be disclosed. Overall, the mean disclosure scores for most items are high, if not 100 
percent. However, companies are reluctant to reveal information on the amount 
(value) of the options issued. The mean (pooled sample) for this item exhibits the 
lowest disclosure level at 71.86 percent.  Firms are the most forthcoming with 
disclosure on the nature of the emolument and who is granting the options. The mean 
scores for each of these items is 100 percent.  The mean for the total level of 
compliance with the legislation is 92.38 percent (pooled sample).   
In comparing the mean scores between 2000 and 2002, it can be seen that the 
average level of compliance across all items has increased slightly.  However, the 
lowest mean continues to be the mandated disclosure, the amount (value) of options 
granted, which is the most sensitive of the required disclosures.  The mean for the 
total level of compliance increased slightly in 2002 (93.13 percent) from 2000 (91.55 
percent). Table 2 reports the number of firms at various compliance levels. The firms 
                                                 
5 The companies are classified into industries based on the ASX Industry Code classifications. 
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are broken down in this manner because not all firms are 100 percent compliant with 
the legislation.  It can be seen that out of the total sample of 153 firms, 100 (65 
percent) are fully compliant with the legislation.   
Place Tables 1 and 2 here. 
The analysis of the sensitive component of these mandatory disclosures, the 
amount (value) of options issued, is reported in Table 3.  Table 3 shows that 43 firms 
(28.10 percent) in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of options granted to 
their directors and the five most highly remunerated officers.  However, 110 firms 
(71.90 percent) did disclose a value but 27 (17.6 percent) of these were a ‘Nil’ value. 
Although overall compliance is very high, companies are secretive about the value of 
the options issued.  Table 4 shows the various percentages of information that firms 
disclosed in the directors report.  It can be seen that 117 (76.47 percent) firms disclose 
100 percent of the required disclosures in the directors’ report.  This result suggests 
that most firms follow what the legislation dictates and disclose the required 
information in the directors’ report rather than the notes to the financial statements.  
Table 5 indicates that the items most likely to be disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements are the amount (value) of options granted and the class of shares over 
which options are granted. Perhaps this is because the notes are less visible as 
compared to the directors’ report. 
Place Tables 3, 4 and 5 here. 
The results of research question 2 (a) and (b) are presented in Tables 6 and 7 
with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 6. The results reported in Table 7 
indicate that larger firms (p<0.01) and firms in the finance industry (p<0.05) are more 
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likely to disclose the required information in the notes to the financial statements 
rather than the directors’ report to improve their credibility. 
Place Tables 6 and 7 here. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
  We investigate compliance with mandatory stock option disclosures made in 
the directors’ report for the directors and the five most highly remunerated officers of 
Australian companies in the top 400 companies for the years 2000 and 2002.  We also 
examine whether there is consistent compliance across all categories of the required 
disclosures, including sensitive disclosures, and the choice to position these 
disclosures in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to the directors’ report.   
Although compliance is high for most of the required stock option disclosures, 
43 of the 153 firms in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of the options 
issued. Another 27 of the companies disclosed a “Nil” value for the value of options 
issued. Most companies disclosed the information in the directors’ report, with larger 
companies and companies in the finance industry more likely to disclose in the notes 
to the financial statements, where the disclosures are less visible. The results indicate 
that companies are secretive about the most sensitive of the required disclosures, the 
amount (value) of the options issued.  Regulators and researchers need to be cautious 
in conducting compliance studies as although companies appear to be transparent in 
their disclosures about stock options for directors, closer examination reveals secrecy 
about sensitive components of the required disclosures. 
Our results are subject to several limitations.  The first limitation is the sample 
size of firms using options.  The size is mainly due to the very selective criteria used 
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in choosing companies to be included, for example, 67 companies were eliminated for 
having a year end that was not 30 June.  Another limitation is in regards to the 
generalisability of the results. Our study is not specific to any particular industry.  
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Appendix A 
Disclosure Index of Corporations Law and Corporations Act 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reference  Score 
Annual directors' report—specific information to be 
provided by listed companies  
(2) The directors' report for a financial year for a company 
must also include:  
(c) details of the nature and amount of each element of the 
emolument of each director and each of the 5 named 
officers of the company receiving the highest emolument.  
 
Annual directors' report—specific information  
(1) The directors' report for a financial year must include 
details of:  
(d) options that are:  
(i) granted over unissued shares or unissued interests during or 
since the end of the year; and  
(ii) granted to any of the directors or any of the 5 most highly 
remunerated officers of the company; and  
(iii) granted to them as part of their remuneration; 
 
(5) The details of an option granted are:  
(a) the company, registered scheme or disclosing entity 
granting the option; and  
(b) the name of the person to whom the option is granted; and  
(c) the number and class of shares or interests over which the 
option is granted.  
 
s.300A (1)(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s.300(1)(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s.300(5) 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
Total Items to be Disclosed  6 
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Figure 1 
 
Sample taken from BRW Top 400 Publicly Listed Companies for 2000 and 2002  
 
 
 
 
  
Companies included in sample 2000 2002 
Companies using stock options as a form of executive compensation  73 80 
   
Reason for elimination from sample   
Not using stock options as a form of executive compensation, i.e. no plan 47 42 
Did not issue options to directors or 5 most highly remunerated executives in the 
financial year 
23 21 
Did not have 30 June year end 67 67 
Company was a trust or fund 44 44 
Not an Australian company 14 14 
Experienced a change in name, i.e. possible change in ownership 109 109 
Annual report not available on Connect 4 database 23 23 
   
Total companies eliminated from sample 327 320 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporations Law (Act)  
Components (Pooled Sample)  
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
2000 
Mean 
2002 
 (n=153)     (n=73) (n=80) 
Corporations 
Law/Act s. 300A 
      
Nature of 
emolument 
0.1.000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Amount granted 0.7186 0.4510 0.0000 1.0000 0.6986 0.7376 
Corporations 
Law/Act s. 300A 
      
Company 
granting options 
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Names of people 
options granted 
to 
0.9608 0.1948 0.0000 1.0000 0.9590 0.9625 
Number granted 0.9543 0.2096 0.0000 1.0000 0.9452 0.9625 
Type of share 
under option 
0.9085 0.2893 0.0000 1.0000 0.8904 0.9250 
Total Mandatory 
Disclosure 
0.9238 0.1297 0.0000 1.0000 0.9155 0.9313 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Disclosure of Directors’ Executive Stock Options for 2000 and 2002 under the 
Corporations Law/Act n = 153 
 
Compliance Level 2000 2002 
Less than 50% 2 1 
50% -59% 1 0 
60% - 69% 2 4 
70% - 79% 0 0 
80% - 89% 22 21 
90% - 99% 0 0 
100% 46 54 
TOTAL 73 80 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Information Disclosed in Directors’ Report 
 2000 2002 Total Out of 153 Firms 
Less than 50% 7 5 12 
50% - 59% 0 0 0 
60% - 69% 1 4 5 
70% - 79% 0 2 2 
80% - 89% 9 8 17 
90% - 99% 0 0 0 
100% 56 61 117 
 
  
Table 3 
Firms Disclosing Value of Options Granted 
 2000 
(n=73) 
2002 
(n=80) 
Total 
(n=153) 
Number Not Disclosing Value 22 
(30.1%) 
21 
(28.8%) 
43 
(28.1%) 
Disclosed ‘Nil’ value 14 
(19.2%) 
13 
(17.8%) 
27 
(17.6%) 
Disclosed actual value 37 
(50.7%) 
46 
(63%) 
83 
(54.2%) 
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Table 5 
Disclosure location of the legislative components in terms of  
the number of firms (N=153) 
Location *Nature *Amount *Company *Name *Number *Class 
Non-Audited: 
Directors’ 
Report 
144 
94.12% 
96 
87.27% 
142 
92.81% 
134 
91.16% 
133 
91.10% 
113 
81.29%
Audited: 
Notes 9 
5.88% 
14 
12.73% 
11 
7.19% 
13 
8.84% 
13 
8.90% 
26 
18.71%
Total (153) 153 110 153 147 146 139 
 
Directors’ Report:  
2000 67 45 66 63 62 52 
2002 77 51 76 71 71 61 
Sub-Total  144 96 142 134 133 113 
Notes: 
2000 6 6 7 7 7 13 
2002 3 8 4 6 6 13 
Sub-Total  9 14 11 13 13 26 
* Nature: the nature of the emolument 
* Amt Granted: the amount (value) of options granted 
* Company: the company, registered scheme, or disclosing entity granting options 
* Name granted to: Name of person to whom option is granted 
* Number granted: the number of shares over which options are granted 
*Class granted: the class of shares over which options are granted 
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Table 7 
Univariate T-tests  
Panel A: Independent T-Test 
Variable Mean 
(Median) 
Independent Sample 
T-test 
 1 0 t-statistic 
IND_CODE 62.50 92.45 -2.101** 
 (62.50) (100.00)  
Panel B: Correlation Analysis 
 P_DR_DSR LOGASSET 
P_DR_DSR 1.000 -0.088 
LOGASSET# -0.250*** 1.000 
# Correlations examined using Pearson (left)  and Spearman Pairwise (right) correlation 
(one-tailed test)  
*, **, *** Significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Variable definitions: 
LOGASSET = log of total assets 
P_DR_DSR = total mandatory disclosures made in directors’ report divided by 
total mandatory disclosures made overall 
IND_CODE = 1 for finance industry, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics (N=153) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Median 
Primary Variable: 
P_DR_DSR 25 100 90.88 20.624 100 
Continuous:      
LOGASSET 6.71 11.40 8.6209 0.798 8.5347 
 Coding No. of firms in 
Sample 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Dichotomous: 
IND_CODE 0 145 94.2 
 1 8 5.2 
Variable Definitions: 
LOGASSET = log of total assets 
P_DR_DSR = total mandatory disclosures made in directors’ report divided by total 
mandatory disclosures made overall 
IND_CODE = 1 for finance industry, 0 otherwise 
